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DESIGNING THE TAX TREATMENT OF
LITIGATION-RELATED COSTS
by
Sachin S. Pandya* and Stephen Utz**
ABSTRACT
Defendants often deduct for income tax purposes their litigation-related
costs, such as attorney fees and payments to settle claims or satisfjjudg-
ments. The result is often a large gap between the sticker price of set-
tlements or judgments and their after-tax cost-what defendants really
pay out of pocket. The problem: For every dollar that a defendant
avoids in tax liability by, for example, deducting the damage awards it
pays, the civil justice system falls that much short of its corrective-
justice or optimal-deterrence goals in that case. For this reason, the
entire civil justice system should care about this question: How should
income tax law treat litigation-related costs? This Article identifies the
critical tax-design choices that must be faced but that prior commen-
tary has largely ignored: How to attribute litigation-related costs to an
income-producing activity; whether to treat liability insurer payments
made on a defendant's behalf as income to that defendant; whether to
coordinate the tax treatment ofa payor's damages payments with the tax
treatment ofthose receipts to the payee; and whether litigation-related
costs should be treated as capital expenditures. Then, the Article offers
a new default rule for settlement agreements: Unless a settlement agree-
ment expressly indicates otherwise, a settling defendant promises not to
seek an allowable tax deduction for litigation-related costs. In so doing,
this Article reveals the issues that lawyers, judges, and scholars must
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
** Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
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no longer ignore when they argue over how an income tax system could
or should treat litigation-related costs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants can often deduct from income tax their litigation-related
costs, such as attorney fees and payments to settle claims or satisfy judg-
ments. This remains controversial. Consider for example the billion-
dollar settlements by some financial institutions for their role in the 2008
financial crisis. Some have pointed out that despite the high nominal set-
tlement price, those financial institutions really paid a much lower
after-tax settlement price.1 Or consider that while British Petroleum
agreed to a $20 billion settlement of claims arising from the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, by one estimate, $15.3 billion of that amount was
1. Gretchen Morgenson, Paying the Price, But Often Deducting It,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/business/pay
ing-the-price-in-settlements-but-often-deducting-it.html; Michael Rapoport
& Dan Fitzpatrick, JP. Morgan's $5.1 Billion Settlement Is Tax Deductible;
Bank Could Save Nearly $1.5 Billion in Taxes, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/jp-morgan8217s-51-billion-settlement-is-tax
-deductible-1383082213; Michael Rapoport & Christina Rexrode, Citigroup to
Get Tax Silver Lining in $7Billion Settlement, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (July 14,
2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/07/14/citigroup-to-get-tax-silver
-lining-in-7-billion-settlement/.
534 Florida Tax Review [Vol 21:2
Designing the Tax Treatment ofLitigation-Related Costs
tax-deductible.2 A more recent example: When U.S. President Donald
Trump recently settled lawsuits alleging fraud in his former "Trump
University" business, Trump agreed to pay $25 million in restitution.
Neither Trump, nor the private plaintiffs, nor the New York Attorney
General mentioned that because most of this $25 million was tax-
deductible, Trump's after-tax settlement price was a lot less.3
Similarly, when defendants settle with government agencies,
there is this worry: Both defendants and government regulators high-
light the settlement sticker price, not the much lower after-tax settlement
price; as a result, settling defendants inflate their contrition, regulators
inflate their law-enforcement zeal, and both thereby mislead the pub-
lic.4 Such concerns also fuel the long-standing controversy over the tax
deductibility of punitive damages awards.'
These controversies, however, depend on your answer to this
harder question: How should income tax law treat litigation-related
2. Robert W. Wood, In BP's Final $20 Billion GulfSettlement, U.S.
Taxpayers Subsidize $15.3 Billion, FORBES (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/robertwood/2016/04/06/in-bps-final-20-billion-gulf-settlement-u
-s-taxpayers-subsidize-15-3-billion/#745d79ae36b2.
3. Stipulation of Class Action Settlement, Exhibit 1 to Joint Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Low v. Trump Univer-
sity LLC, No. 3:10-cv-00940-GPC(WVG) (S.D. Cal., Dec. 19, 2016), ECF
No. 583-1; Robert W. Wood, Trump Gets $25 Million Tax Write-Offfor Trump
University Settlement, FORBES (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/robertwood/2016/11/18/trump -gets-25 -million-tax-write-off-for-trump -uni
versity-settlement/.
4. E.g., PHINEAs BAXANDALL & MICHELLE SURKA, U.S. PUB. INTEREST
RESEARCH GRP. EDUC. FUND, SETTLING FOR A LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY?: WHICH
FEDERAL AGENCIES ALLOW COMPANIES TO WRITE OFF OUT-OF-COURT SETTLEMENTS
As TAX DEDUCTIONS, AND WHICH ARE TRANSPARENT ABOUT IT 1-2 (Dec. 2015).
In response, some have proposed limiting, or requiring better reporting of, the
tax-deductibility of settlements with public agencies. E.g., Truth in Settlements
Act of 2015, S. 1109, 114th Cong. (2015); Government Settlement Transpar-
ency and Reform Act, S. 1654, 113th Cong. (2013).
5. Harriet M. King, The Insurability ofPunitive Damages: A New
Solution to an Old Dilemma, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (1980); Dan Markel,
Overcoming Tradeoffs in the Taxation of Punitive Damages, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 609 (2011); Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility ofPunitive Damage
Payments: Who Should Ultimately Bear the Burden for Corporate Misconduct?,
47 ALA. L. REV. 825 (1996); Robert W. Wood, Why Punitive Damages Should
Remain Deductible, 124 TAX NOTES 149 (July 13, 2009).
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costs? On this question, prior commentary offers two main answers.
Some oppose deductibility, fearing that it reduces how well monetary
sanctions can enhance social welfare or proportionally match a defen-
dant's moral responsibility for illegal activity.6 For every dollar a defen-
dant avoids in tax liability by deducting damages, the civil justice system
becomes that much less effective in meeting its goals in that defendant's
case. For this reason, the tax treatment of litigation-related costs matters
to the purposes, scope, and effect of the entire civil justice system.
Others, however, favor deductibility so that personal income tax
burdens can more closely depend on net personal income (one's gross
receipts minus one's cost of producing those receipts). If so, their argu-
ment goes, income tax law would tend not to affect what a taxpayer does
to produce income and would also make personal income tax burdens
roughly proportional to taxpayers' actual buying power.' This implies
that an income tax code should calibrate tax burdens by accounting for
all the costs of receipts-producing activity, including litigation-related
costs, even if such activity is illegal or socially disfavored.'
The problem is that despite the high stakes for the entire civil
justice system, prior commentary on this question has largely ignored
some critical tax-design issues.9 Put simply, taxing only net income does
not entail allowing deduction of all litigation-related costs. How should
we structure litigation-cost deductibility? It depends on a series of com-
plex and interconnected tax-design choices, such as how to attribute
income to taxpayer activity; how to treat liability insurance payments;
whether to coordinate the tax consequences of defendant-payors and
plaintiff-payees; and how much tax authorities and taxpayers should be
expected to do to enforce or comply with income tax law, respectively.
6. On the other hand, some models suggest that the deductibility of
litigation-related costs may increase social welfare. E.g., Jacob Nussim & Avra-
ham D. Tabbach, Deterrence and Tax Treatment of Monetary Sanctions and
Litigation Costs, 29 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 1, 7 (2009); I.P.L. Png & Eric M. Zolt,
Efficient Deterrence and the Tax Treatment ofMonetary Sanctions, 9 INT'L REV.
L. & EcoN. 209, 216-17 (1989).
7. E.g., James W. Colliton, The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Dis-
approved Payments, 9 VA. TAX REV. 273 (1989).
8. Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of
Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1989).
9. See Stephen Utz, Tax Design Goals and How to Use Them, 157
TAX NOTES 1759, 1763-66 (Dec. 18, 2017) (discussing tax design elements and
tax design goals).
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These design choices are distinct. They do not necessarily follow from
any specific redistributive goals for the tax system or from corrective jus-
tice or social-welfare-maximization goals for imposing monetary legal
sanctions. And yet, for progress and clarity to occur, lawyers, judges,
and scholars must no longer ignore these issues.
This Article identifies these tax-design choices. The Article pro-
ceeds as follows. Part II briefly surveys the relevant tax law in seven
countries, focusing on the relevant U.S. tax law. The Article then turns
to the key tax-design issues. Part III discusses the complexity associ-
ated with attributing litigation-related costs to an income-producing
activity. Part IV discusses whether to treat liability insurer payments
made on a defendant's behalf as income to that defendant. Part V identi-
fies grounds for coordinating the tax treatment of a defendant-payor's
damages payments with the tax treatment of those receipts to the
plaintiff-payee, namely, that these payments are part of bilateral exchanges
in which the defendant pays the plaintiff for a loss or for the value of
property the defendant still has and uses. Part VI concerns whether
some litigation-related costs should be treated as capital expenditures
related to the right to receipts established or sought to be established by
the litigation itself.
Finally, Part VII proposes a new default rule for settlement
agreements: Unless expressly indicated otherwise by agreement or stat-
ute, a settling defendant promises, as a term of the settlement, not to
seek an otherwise allowable tax deduction for litigation-related costs.
Under current U.S. law, parties can already enforce such a settlement
term, and a few have done so. By adopting such a term as a default rule,
lawyers for private parties and the government would be more account-
able in their settlements. If settlement agreements contain an express
term allowing a party to seek a tax deduction for litigation-related costs,
such agreements would credibly signal to judges and the public that the
settling parties were aware of the gap between the nominal and the after-
tax settlement price, and settled anyway. Accordingly, policymakers
would be forced to grapple with whether and how to abrogate that default
rule when they enact or amend causes of action.
This Article substantially advances the prior commentary
(which is largely descriptive or outdated)"o in several ways. It both
10. See, e.g., ROBERT W. WOOD, TAXATION OF DAMAGE AWARDS AND
SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS (4th ed. 2012); Valentine Brookes, Litigation Expenses
and the Income Tax, 12 TAX L. REV. 241 (1957); John C. Bruton, The Deductibility
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extends and takes issue with prior work on whether to treat liability
insurer payments made on a defendant's behalf as income to that defen-
dant." It examines and complicates the grounds for prior arguments
that litigation-related costs should be treated as capital expenditures.
Finally, the Article offers a novel default rule that would make policy-
makers more likely to fully and openly grapple with the tax-design choices
identified here.
II. BACKGROUND
In at least seven jurisdictions (United States, Canada, France, South
Africa, Australia, Germany, United Kingdom), income tax law, at least
on paper, generally permits deductions for payments for attorney fees
and payments to settle or satisfy claims, provided such payments are suf-
ficiently connected to income-producing activity, particularly trade or
business activity.12 Taxpayers generally cannot deduct fines and penal-
ties payable to the government, either because of an express statutory
prohibition (e.g., United States, Canada, France, South Africa, Austra-
lia) or a general judicial and agency authority to disallow deductions on
a case-by-case basis (e.g., Germany, United Kingdom).13 Moreover,
ofLegal Expenses in Computing Income Tax, 3 S.C. L.Q. 107 (1950); Donald H.
Gordon, The Public Policy Limitation on Deductions from Gross Income: A
Conceptual Analysis, 43 IND. L.J. 406 (1968); William T. Plumb Jr., Income Tax
on Gains and Losses in Litigation, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 16 (1940); Note, Business
Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems of Sanctioning
with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108 (1962).
11. Jeffrey H. Kahn, Hedging the IRS-A Policy Justification for
Excluding Liability and Insurance Proceeds, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 15-16
(2009); King, supra note 5, at 367-72.
12. FC of T v Rowe (1995) 95 ATC 4691 (Austl.); McKnight v.
Sheppard [1999] 71 TC (HL) 419 (U.K.); Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 § 11(c)
(S. Afr.); Can. Customs & Rev. Agency, Bulletin IT-99R5 (Consol.) (2000);
S. Afr. Rev. Serv., Interpretation Note: No. 54 (Feb. 26, 2010); PETER W. HOGG
ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CANADIAN INCOME TAX LAw 224-29 (8th ed. 2013); 5
MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 24A:18 (Westlaw 2018) (U.S.);
WOOD, supra note 10, at ch. 6 (U.S.). See generally HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J.
ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 288-90 (3d
ed. 2010).
13. Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 26-5 (Austl.); Income
Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) § 67.6 (Can.); Code G6n6ral des Imp6ts
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some taxpayers pay litigation-related costs to acquire, dispose of, or
defend title to an asset, such as a parcel of land, a patent, or a professional
license.14 If so, they cannot deduct such costs when paid or incurred
(as is permitted for an ordinary expense). Instead, those costs must be
added to the asset's "basis," or in a non-U.S. jurisdiction, to the asset's
tax book value. Then, when one sells or otherwise disposes of the asset,
that basis is subtracted from the proceeds, resulting in either a net gain
or a loss.
In the United States, since at least the Revenue Act of 1913,"
U.S. courts and the government have largely considered attorney fees
[Tax Code] art. 39 § 2 (Fr.); Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [Income Tax
Act], Oct. 8, 2009, BGBL I at 3384-85, § 4, no. (5)10 (Ger.); Income Tax Act
58 of 1962 § 23(o)(ii) (S. Afr.); McKnight v. Sheppard [1999] 71 TC (HL) 419
(U.K.); I.R.C. § 162(f) (U.S.).
14. Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 § 11(c) (S. Afr.); Comm'r for Inland
Rev. v. Nemojim (Pty) Ltd 1983 (4) SA 935 (S. Afr.); Re Taxpayer & Comm'r
of Tax'n (2013) 97 ATR 680, 693-94, [2013] AATA 783 ¶ 72 (Austl.); Can.
Customs & Rev. Agency, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 14-15.
15. During the first U.S. federal income tax (1861-72) (see HAR-
OLD Q. LANGENDERFER, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 1861-1872, at 239-448 (1980)),
in 1865, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled by letter: "No deduction
can be made from income for money paid on a judgment of any court against
the tax-payer," though payments received to satisfy settled claims or court judg-
ments were exempt from income. Letter from E.A. Rollins, Deputy Comm'r
(May 1, 1865), in Damages Recovered in Actions Not Taxable, Etc., 1 INTERNAL
REV. RECORDER & CUSTOMS J. 155 (1865). A year later, the Deputy Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue declared, responding to an inquiry "relative to the
deduction of fines and penalties from income," that "penalties imposed for
violations of excise law, are legitimate offsets to the profits of the business in
connection with which they were incurred; but they cannot be allowed as deduc-
tions from income actually realized from other pursuits." Letter from Thomas
Harland, Deputy Comm'r (July 27, 1866), in Deductions ofFines and Penal-
ties in Estimating Income, 4 INTERNAL REV. RECORDER & CUSTOMS J. 46 (1866).
At the same time, federal tax assessors were instructed: "Costs of suits and
other legal proceedings arising from ordinary business are to be treated as other
expenses of such business, and may be deducted from the gross profits thereof."
Office of Internal Rev., United States Internal Revenue-Instructions to United
States Assessors, Concerning the Assessment ofIncomes, Articles in Schedule
A, and Licenses, for the Year 1866, 3 INTERNAL REV. RECORDER & CUSTOMS J. 147,
147 ¶ 12 (1866). Under the short-lived Revenue Act of 1894 (1894-1895), a Trea-
sury regulation adopted a close variant of this business expense deduction for
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and other expenses paid or incurred to defend against a lawsuit as "ordi-
nary and necessary" business expenses. Today, Code section 162(a)
provides that a taxpayer may deduct "all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business."1 6 As read by courts and government tax officials,
section 162(a) and its statutory antecedents treat as "ordinary and nec-
essary" what a taxpayer pays or incurs to settle a claim or satisfy a
judgment-including portions of a judgment awarding punitive dam-
ages to private parties,1 7 as well as attorney fees paid or incurred to
defend against a lawsuit-provided that such expenses were paid or
incurred "in carrying on any trade or business." When a taxpayer pays
to cover another's expenses, however, those expenses do not usually
count as that taxpayer's "ordinary" expenses under section 162(a) on the
premise that businesses do not customarily pay off the debts of others.
In 1942, Congress added the predecessor to Code section 212,
which allows an individual to deduct "all the ordinary and necessary
"costs of suits." ROGER FOSTER & EVERETT V. ABBOT, A TREATISE ON THE FED-
ERAL INCOME TAX UNDER THE ACT OF 1894, at 492 ¶ 9 (1895).
16. I.R.C. § 162(a); see also Reg. § 1.162-1(a).
17. Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 57.
18. See Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 497 (1940); John R. Dorocak,
The Clintons' Legal Defense Fund: Income from Payment of Legal Expenses
by Another and Deductibility of Such Expenses, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 16-27
(2001). Exceptions include mployer payments to cover their employees' legal
expenses pursuant to an indemnification agreement (Rev. Rul. 78-210, 1978-1
C.B. 39; see also Larchfield Corp. v. United States, 373 F.2d 159, 167 (2d Cir.
1966)); premiums for work-related liability insurance for corporate directors
and officers as promised in their employment agreements (Rev. Rul. 69-491,
1969-2 C.B. 22; see also Rev. Rul. 76-277, 1976-2 C.B. 41); and "where the
original obligor is unable to make payment and the taxpayer satisfies the obli-
gation to protect its own business interests," as indicated by a showing that
the obligor's inability to pay would have had a "direct and proximate" adverse
impact on the taxpayer's business (W. Covina Motors, Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo 2008-237, 2008 WL 4706469, at *4 (2008); see also Hood v. Comm'r,
115 T.C. 172, 180-81 (2000) (corporate taxpayer paid legal fees of its sole
shareholder); Lohrke v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 679 (1967)), which matters in cases
where a corporate taxpayer claims a deduction under section 162(a) for the
attorney fees incurred by that corporate taxpayer's employee, officer, or share-
holder for defending against a civil suit or criminal prosecution (see Capital
Video Corp. v. Comm'r, 311 F.3d 458, 464 (1st Cir. 2002)).
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expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year" for producing or
collecting income, including managing, conserving, or maintaining
property "held for the production of income," as well as expenses "in
connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax."1 9
To deduct litigation-related costs under section 212, those costs have to
be attributed to a legal claim that arose in connection with the individual
taxpayer's profit-seeking activity.20
In 1969, Congress amended Code section 162 to expressly
disallow some kinds of expenses otherwise deductible under section
162(a), including a "fine or similar penalty paid to a government for the
violation of any law."21 Thereafter, courts and the IRS take Congress to
have stripped courts and the IRS of discretion to disallow a section 162(a)
deduction because such deduction would frustrate "public policy." The
IRS has on its own extended some of section 162's disallowances to
cover deductions under Code section 212.22 More recently, Congress
amended section 162 to disallow deductions for "any settlement or pay-
ment related to sexual harassment or sexual abuse if such settlement or
payment is subject to a nondisclosure agreement," as well as to disal-
low any deductions for "attorney's fees related to such a settlement or
payment."23
Finally, amounts paid "to defend or perfect" title to property
are not deductible but must be "capitalized" or added to the basis
of the property.24 Capitalized costs-called "expenditures" instead of
"expenses"-include amounts paid to defend or perfect title to not
only real and personal property but also to intangible property, such as
19. I.R.C. § 212.
20. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 48-49 (1963).
21. I.R.C. § 162(f). For discussion, see F. Phillip Manns Jr., Inter-
nal Revenue Code Section 162(f): When Does the Payment of Damages to a
Government Punish the Payor?, 13 VA. TAX REV. 271 (1993).
22. Reg. § 1. 2 1 2 -1(p) (disallowing section 212 deduction "if the
payment is of a type for which a deduction would be disallowed under sec-
tion 162(c), (f), or (g) and the regulations thereunder in the case of a business
expense"). Unlike section 162(a), the casualty loss deduction under Code sec-
tion 165 remains subject to the frustration-of-public-policy doctrine. Stephens
v. Comm'r, 905 F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir. 1990); Medeiros v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.
1255, 1262 (1981); Rev. Rul. 77-126, 1977-1 C.B. 47.
23. Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13307(a), 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified
at I.R.C. § 162(q)).
24. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(e)(1); see I.R.C. § 263(a).
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patents, licenses, easement rights, and even the corporate charter of the
corporate taxpayer that incurs the expenditures when there is no other
suitable asset to which they can be capitalized.2 5 Such litigation-related
costs become part of the "basis" of the asset. Then, to determine whether
a taxpayer has a net gain or loss upon selling or otherwise disposing of
the asset, the asset's basis must be subtracted from the "amount real-
ized" on the asset's sale/disposition-roughly the proceeds of the sale,
as adjusted to reflect tax considerations.2 6
III. ATTRIBUTING LITIGATION-RELATED COSTS TO INCOME-
PRODUCING ACTIVITY
Because taxing new wealth, net of costs, is the essence of the income
tax, the costs of income production must be deducted from gross income
in calculating taxable income. As a result, deductions for litigation-
related costs depend on rules that attribute those costs to a taxpayer's
income-producing activity as closely related to it. How should we write
those attribution rules? This is the first tax-design choice.
In the seven jurisdictions surveyed above, there are roughly two
approaches to making such an attribution: (1) whether the taxpayer
incurred the expense with a bona fide purpose of producing income-
which usually does not apply to defendants-and (2) whether the expense
was, though unplanned, "caused" by an event, possibly unexpected and
even adverse, but typical of the taxpayer's income-producing activity.27
25. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-2(e)(1),-4(d)(9)(i),-4(d)(9)(iii) (illustrative
example),-4(e)(5); Reg. § 1.212-1(k). The "origin-of-the-claim standard"
must be used to decide whether litigation-related costs are nondeductible cap-
ital expenditures. Woodward v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572, 578-79 (1970); Ash
Grove Cement Co. v. United States, 562 F. App'x 697, 699-701 (10th Cir. 2014)
(legal fees and settlement paid to settle shareholder class action lawsuit were
capital expenditures because incurred to defend and maintain corporate
reorganization); see Clark Oil & Ref Corp. v. United States, 473 F.2d 1217,
1220-21 (7th Cir. 1973) (amounts paid to settle nuisance action brought to
establish price of property, were capital expenditures).
26. I.R.C. § 1001(a).
27. I.R.C. § 162(a) ("ordinary and necessary" to the taxpayer's
income-producing activity); Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 8-1 (Austl.);
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) § 18(1)(a) (Can.) (no deduction
for outlay or "expense except to the extent that it was made or incurred by the
taxpayer for the purpose of gaining or producing income from the business or
542 Florida Tax Review [Vol 21:2
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For the latter approach, complexity arises because the probabil-
ity of getting sued varies by type of income-producing activity. For
example, an obstetrics medical practice might be more likely to be sued,
all else equal, than a medical practice specializing in ear, nose, and throat
conditions; a retailer seller of canned spinach; or anyone engaged in any
type of income-producing activity because of the distinctive risks of
adverse medical events associated with childbirth as compared to other
hospital events or running any kind of business.
To illustrate further, suppose we credibly believe from experi-
ence that every living individual adult (or other taxable unit) in the
society has a one percent probability of getting sued given basic back-
ground conditions like being subject to the law of the jurisdiction during
the relevant time. Suppose further that for the subset of people in the
society that engage in some income-producing activity (e.g., operating
a medical practice, running a bakery) the probability of getting sued
rises to two percent. Now consider the subset of people in the society
who operate an obstetrics medical practice. If their probability of getting
sued is, all else equal, less than or equal to two percent, it cannot be con-
cluded that the costs of getting sued are causally connected to the tax-
payer's choice of pursuing an obstetrics practice in particular. The
more that probability exceeds two percent, the greater the confidence
we might have about attributing the cost of getting sued to that particular
activity.
The conceptual difficulty: We can always describe the taxpay-
er's income-producing activity to make it belong to more than one type.
property"); Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 § 11(c) (S. Afr.) (deduction for legal
expenses actually incurred by the taxpayer "in respect of any claim, dispute
or action at law arising in the course of or by reason of the ordinary operations
undertaken by him in the carrying on of his trade"); Income Tax (Trading and
Other Income) Act 2005, c. 4, § 34(1)(a) (U.K.) (for calculating trade profit,
disallowing "expenses not incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of
the trade"); Frais et charges - Conditions g6n6rales de d6duction - Frais et
charges expos6s dans l'int&t de l'entreprise, BOI-BIC-CHG-10-10-20120912,
BULL. OFFICIEL DES FINANCES PUBLIQUES-IMPOTS (Fr.) (company deductible
expenses: "I1 faut notamment que ces d6penses soient expos6es dans l'int6r&t
de l'exploitation ou dans le cadre d'une gestion normale de l'entreprise.");
Detlef R. Stapperfend, § 4 EStG, in HERRMANN/HEUER/RAUPACH ESTG/KSTG
KOMMENTAR, 283 [HERRMANN/HEUER/RAUPACH INCOME TAX AND CORPORATE
TAX ACT, COMMENT], ¶¶ 791-93, 815, 832 (Dec. 2017) (Ger.) (business expense
must have causal relationship with the activity it serves).
2018] 543
An obstetrics practice may belong simultaneously to the set "all activi-
ties involving the provision of medical services," the set of "medical
practices provided" in a particular state, and the set of "medical provid-
ers of assistance during childbirth"-all of which are subsets of the
general set of "income-producing activities." If the probability of get-
ting sued varies for each subset, and no one such subset self-evidently
describes that taxpayer's "type" of activity, then which subset (and thus
which probability) do we choose? This is an instance of the general
reference-class problem.2 8 To overcome that problem, we would need
second-order rules for matching a taxpayer's income-producing activ-
ity with pre-set activity categories (e.g., occupational classifications) and
with accompanying estimates of the probability of getting sued.2 9
An alternative approach: Ignore any variation in the probabil-
ity of getting sued associated with the type of income-producing activ-
ity. Instead, estimate the probability of getting sued regardless of the
type of income-producing activity and then just assume that, if sued,
the taxpayer is more likely than not to suffer some litigation-related costs
as a result.
For example, under Code section 162(a), only "ordinary and
necessary" expenses are deductible. Reading this threshold qualifica-
tion as type-insensitive, it may be interpreted to classify an expense as
"necessary" if "appropriate and helpful" "for the development of the
[taxpayer's] business," and "ordinary" even if rarely incurred by a tax-
payer.3 0 As the U.S. Supreme Court declared in Welch v. Helvering:
A lawsuit affecting the safety of a business may happen
once in a lifetime. The counsel fees may be so heavy
that repetition is unlikely. None the less, the expense
is an ordinary one because we know from experience
that payments for such a purpose, whether the amount
28. See generally Alan Hdjek, The Reference Class Problem Is
Your Problem Too, 156 SYNTHESE 563 (2007).
29. The reference class problem also makes it hard to coherently
determine (on non-normative grounds alone) the size of the subsidy to the
taxpayer that results when, because of the deductibility of litigation costs, that
taxpayer's net (after-tax) cost of settlement decreases.
30. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
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is large or small, are the common and accepted means
of defense against attack.3 1
This alternative approach has two advantages. First, it may be
too hard for a tax system to judge the accuracy or reliability of taxpayer
estimates (or its own estimates) of the probability of being sued, given
a particular income-producing activity, in deciding whether the tax-
payer's litigation-related costs are properly attributed to that activity.
The U.S. approach avoids this difficulty-including any reference class
problem with defining the "types" of income-producing activities-by
relying on the taxpayer's bona fide but subjective judgment that a cost
is appropriate and helpful to its income-producing activity. U.S. tax
authorities appear to generally but not invariably defer to taxpayer judg-
ment in this regard,3 2 as do U.S. courts.3 3 Second, it may be just cheaper
to enforce and comply with tax law by pursuing so-called book-tax
conformity-that is, by limiting the extent to which tax accounting
31. Id. at 114; accord Comm'r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 471-72
(1943); see also Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 152 (1928) (attorney
fees to defend against lawsuit brought by his former business partner were
"ordinary and necessary" expenses: "a suit ordinarily and, as a general thing
at least, necessarily requires the employment of counsel and payment of his
charges").
32. See Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (nine factors for determining whether a
taxpayer has bona fide expectation of realizing a profit from an activity for
which cost deductions are claimed).
33. See, e.g., Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(taxpayer couple could deduct expenses of very passive investment activity
based solely on their claim that they spent 40 hours a week working at the activ-
ity); Nickerson v. Comm'r, 700 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1983) (taxpayer's operating
losses on bona fide but part-time efforts to rehabilitate farm were deductible,
because the "ordinary and necessary" standard does not require a realistic
prospect of profit); Misko v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2005-166, 2005 WL 1580809
(2005) (practicing lawyer allowed to deduct expenses arising from non-
profitable rentals of video equipment he also used himself in making videos
for use at trial). But see Chaganti v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2013-285, 2013 WL
6638844 (2013) (payments made to opposing counsel by taxpayer attorney as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1927, authorizing payments to cover costs incurred
because of unreasonable and vexatious litigation, are necessarily not "ordinary
and necessary" to the practice of law under I.R.C. § 162(a)).
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(either in general or for litigation-related costs in particular) diverges
from financial accounting.3 4
IV. LIABILITY INSURANCE PROCEEDS
Many defendants have liability insurance to cover litigation-related costs
such as damage awards, settlements, and attorney fees. Accordingly, the
second design choice: How should income tax law treat payments a lia-
bility insurer makes on behalf of the taxpayer to satisfy a settlement or
judgment against that taxpayer? We identify two equally availing start-
ing premises: (1) align the tax consequences of such payments to what
the tax consequences would have been if that taxpayer had self-insured,
or (2) treat those payments like any other gain realized on a contract.
We then consider views that turn on treating liability insurer payments
as discharging debt arising from litigation.
We first consider as a design premise here that, all else being
equal, income tax law should treat a taxpayer who self-insures-sets
aside funds in reserve to cover litigation-related costs and then pays out-
of-pocket-no differently than a taxpayer for whom a liability insurer
pays those costs. The reason is simple: Neutrality-treating like trans-
actions alike-in taxing net income entails no greater tax burden on
the self-insuring taxpayer than the liability-insuring taxpayer, and
vice-versa.3 5
If so, whether the liability insurer's payment (made on the
insured's behalf) is included in the taxpayer-insured's income should
depend on whether the taxpayer could have deducted them if that tax-
payer itself had paid those amounts. If liability insurance payments cover
such costs that, absent insurance, the insured would have paid or incurred
34. On how tax and financial accounting rules relate in the United
States, United Kingdom, and Australia, see Thomas M. Porcano & Alfred V.
Tran, Relationship of Tax and Financial Accounting Rules in Anglo-Saxon
Countries, 33 INT'L J. ACCT. 433 (1998).
35. Fairness-treating like taxpayers alike-may also require that
the tax system be indifferent to whether the taxpayer buys liability insurance
or self-insures. Payments to self-insure, however, are not usually deductible.
Clougherty Packing Co. v. Comm'r, 811 F.2d 1297, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1987)
(collecting cases). In U.S. tax law, self-insurance is distinguished from insur-
ance, which requires actual risk-shifting and risk-distributing. Helvering v.
Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941).
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those costs directly, and therefore could have deducted them, then exclud-
ing the insurance proceeds from the insured's income measures the
insured's net income no differently than had the taxpayer self-insured
and deducted those expenses when paid or incurred. But if the insured
could not have deducted the expenses that the liability insurance pro-
ceeds are supposed to cover, then such proceeds should be included in
the insured's income. In this respect, the answer (to whether a taxpayer
should exclude liability insurance proceeds from its income) rises
and falls with the same justification-whatever it is-for the deduct-
ibility of the insured costs that the taxpayer, had it self-insured, would
have paid.
Consider, however, a different starting premise: Treat a liability-
insurance recovery like any other gain realized on a contract. By paying
the insurance premium, the insured performs its side of the contract,
i.e., the insurance policy. The insurer has promised to pay if an event
requiring recovery in fact happens during the time interval of that insur-
ance policy. (If not, then depending on the jurisdiction's tax law, the
insured may have a loss on the contract hat may or may not be deduct-
ible.) Like any other realized gain from a contract, every insured's real-
ized gain on an insurance contract must be included in gross income,
absent another rule to the contrary. Indeed, a single contract may serve
as the point of reference for determining whether there is income on a
set of transactions that could each be considered separately, as for exam-
ple a selling-short contract. Similarly, a taxpayer's liability insurance
policy may serve as the point of reference for determining whether there
is income on multiple insurance recoveries arising from the same pol-
icy. Under this approach, the taxpayer's gross income would include the
total insurance recovery amount, albeit reducible by deduction if other
conditions are met.
This approach, however, departs from how income tax laws typ-
ically treat recoveries under first-party property insurance contracts.
To illustrate, suppose an insurer paid an insured an amount to cover the
destruction of the insured's property. That recovery is usually excluded
from the insured's gross income to the extent of the "basis" in U.S. terms,
or tax-adjusted book value, of that property before it was destroyed.36
36. For U.S. tax purposes, the exclusion is only cursorily mentioned
in the Code, where the amount of any deductible loss is reduced by insurance
or other compensation received for the loss. I.R.C. § 165(a). Gain on the sale
or exchange of property is the difference between the "amount realized," or
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Basis is sometimes said to be the owner's "tax investment" in property,
an amount that may be deducted in gain or loss measurement.3 7 Only
the portion of the insurance recovery in excess of that amount is treated
as a gain to the insured of the same character (i.e., capital or ordinary)
of any gain that would have occurred had the insured sold or otherwise
disposed of that property. Viewed another way, any insurance recovery
is first included in gross income, as an amount received in exchange for
the property, which is then reduced by the property's basis.
To underscore this conventional view of how insurance pro-
ceeds offset loss or gain, consider by contrast Kahn's argument that all
liability-insurer payments to satisfy a judgment against the insured
should be excluded from the insured's income.3 8 Kahn reasons that by
paying for liability insurance, the insured has invested in an arrange-
ment whereby the liability insurer, not the insured, is the primary obli-
gor for any debt owed because of the insured's illegal activity.3 9 When
the liability insurance policy pays out, the liability insurance proceeds
"replace dollars" that the insured did pay (or would have paid) to sat-
isfy its judgment-debt:
The replacement of dollars is equivalent to the replace-
ment of basis, and so does not cause the insured to real-
ize any income. Indeed, the justification for excluding
from income amounts received (1) on the sale of an item,
(2) as damages, or (3) as property insurance, to the extent
these amounts do not exceed basis, is that they are a
return of the cash that the owner had invested in the
proceeds of the sale or exchange adjusted for relevant tax considerations and
the property's basis. I.R.C. § 1001(a). The Code does not define "amount real-
ized." Basis is incompletely defined, but there is no serious controversy about
the use of the term in most contexts. By comparison, for German tax pur-
poses, the term equivalent to basis is steuerliches Buchwert or tax book value.
German tax accounting principles are more fully spelled out in Bilanzrecht or
balance-sheet law, than are the corresponding U.S. tax accounting principles.
37. See, e.g., Topic Number 703 - Basis ofAssets, IRS.Gov, https://
www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc703 (last updated Feb. 1, 2018) ("Basis is generally
the amount of your capital investment in property for tax purposes.").
38. Kahn, supra note 11, at 15-16.
39. Id.
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property. When the item replaced is the cash itself, it
is obvious that it is not taxable to the recipient.40
This argument, however, assumes that an insured should be
deemed to have a "basis" in a liability insurance policy-just like a basis
in a patent or other (intangible) capital asset-that always equals the
amount of the insurance proceeds. To illustrate, suppose A pays for lia-
bility insurance for three years at a price of $100 per year. Near the end
of year three, B sues A, and A files a claim with its liability insurer, who
promptly pays $300 to satisfy the terms of a settlement agreement
between A and B. A has paid $300 in insurance premiums and has con-
structively received (reaped an economic benefit under that policy) $300
from its liability insurer. If we assume that, in paying $300 in premi-
ums, A had a "basis" of $300 in the liability insurer's legal duty to indem-
nify A under the insurance policy, then we offset A's gain of $300 by
that amount. The result: net zero gain-the same result if we had just
treated the $300 paid by the liability insurer as excluded from A's income.
Suppose, however, that the liability insurer paid $1,000 to cover
the insured's judgment-debt. If so, then $700 of that $1,000 ($1,000 less
the $300 in "basis") should be included in A's income. To exclude insur-
ance proceeds from income altogether, one must deem a liability insur-
ance policy's "basis" as always equal to the full amount of the insurance
proceeds. If so, then liability insurance is the unusual asset for which we
cannot know the amount invested in it until after it produces a "return"
on that investment.
More importantly, this argument assumes that the insured had
not already deducted the premium paid for the liability insurance as a
cost attributable to its income-producing activity. Had it done so, then
by also excluding liability insurance proceeds from the insured's income,
40. Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted). Dodge argues that excluding lia-
bility insurance proceeds from the insured's income is implicit in U.S. tax
law, because U.S. tax law is best understood to implicitly treat the liability
insurer's payment made on the insured's behalf "as a capital expenditure by the
insured that is instantly offset against the deemed receipt by the insured of the
economic benefit of having a liability satisfied." Joseph M. Dodge, The Netting
of Costs Against Income Receipts (Including Damage Recoveries) Produced by
Such Costs, Without Barring Congress from Disallowing Such Costs, 27 VA.
TAX REV. 297, 339 (2007).
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tax law would in effect let that insured deduct its liability insurance pre-
miums twice-once as a separate deductible expense when paid or
incurred, and then again as part of the liability insurance policy's "basis"
when the liability insurance policy pays out. To avoid such inaccuracy
in measuring the insured's income, therefore, either the liability insur-
ance proceeds (if not excludable on other grounds) must be included
in the insured's income in their entirety-no adjustment for "basis"-or
the tax law should disallow a deduction for the premiums paid or incurred
by the insured.
Finally, since liability insurers pay to satisfy litigation-related
debts incurred by the insured (such as damages owed to a prevailing
plaintiff), one could argue that liability insurance payments should count
as discharge-of-indebtedness income to the insured.4 1 In contrast, Kahn
assumes without discussion that a litigation-based liability of an insured
is "primarily that of the insurer."42 It appears that he believes any
compromise of the obligation cannot therefore result in discharge-of-
indebtedness income to the insured. The liability insurer, however, is
not the party originally liable for the insured's obligation. Therefore,
the insurance contract does not shift the potential for discharge-of-
indebtedness income from the insured to the insurer.43
41. E.g., King, supra note 5, at 367-68.
42. Kahn, supra note 11, at 15.
43. Similarly, King offers the view that a liability insurer is a sec-
ondary obligor of judgment-debt, but that the insurance contract results in the
insured being only contingently liable for the part of the liability the insurer is
not obligated to pay under the insurance policy's terms of coverage. King,
supra note 5, at 369 n.96. As a result, liability insurance payments on the insured's
behalf could arguably be excluded from the insured's income, because "[i]t is
well established that the discharge of a contingent liability by virtue of its full
payment by another is not income to the contingently liable taxpayer." Id. at
369. The revenue ruling King cites, however, is inapposite. It only says that
when a corporation redeems a retiring shareholder's stock, the release of a
continuing shareholder's obligation to purchase any retiring shareholder's tock
if it had been necessary for the solvency of the corporation, is not cancellation-
of-indebtedness income to the released shareholder. See Rev. Rul. 69-608,
1969-2 C.B. 42. However, when a liability insurer pays, the insured's obliga-
tions (e.g., damages, attorney fees) arefixed, not still contingent, and the insured
would be liable if, say, the liability insurer became insolvent and therefore
could not pay as the insurance policy requires.
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Nonetheless, Kahn argues that because a liability insurer agrees
to ultimately bear some subset of the insured's litigation-related debts,
the insurer is the "primary obligor" of those debts; as a result, an insured
should "not be taxed on the insurer's satisfaction of a liability that is pri-
marily that of the insurer."4 4 Whether an obligor is primary or second-
ary, however, only denotes whom of two parties a creditor must first
demand payment of an obligation. For tax purposes, that distinction
alone does not matter. If a taxpayer gives her unconditional guaranty of
a controlled corporation's potential obligation to a third party, she can
be made to pay the obligation when it arises, even if no one has demanded
payment against the corporation. When a taxpayer gratuitously guar-
antees another taxpayer's inchoate obligation, the guarantor's obligation
is only that which she ultimately pays under the guarantee; hence, no
cancellation-of-indebtedness can be attributed to the guarantor by rea-
son of the guarantee alone.45 To be sure, a party with some or equal
responsibility of another's obligation could guarantee that obligation for
the commercial security of the creditor. If the creditor then forgave part
of that obligation, the guarantor might indeed have gross income. The
guarantee itself, however, does not entail that result.
V. COORDINATION OF TAX CONSEQUENCES OF DAMAGES PAYMENTS
In general, whether a defendant-payor may deduct payments from its
gross income to satisfy ajudgment or settlement does not turn on whether
the payee must include the damage payment in its gross income.46
Thus, the third tax-design choice is this: Should payor and payee tax
consequences be coordinated? That is, should the payor generally not
be allowed to deduct those payments if they are excluded from the payee's
44. Kahn, supra note 11, at 15; see id. ("The fact that the insured
could be required to pay the victims of his actions does not make the insured
the primary obligor, since the insured would be entitled to reimbursement
from the insurer if he pays.").
45. Aftergood v. Comm'r, 21 T.C. 60, 63 (1953). To be sure, Kahn
offers "an analogous circumstance where an employee's negligence causes
harm to a third party who recovers damages from the employer. Even though
the employee also was liable for the injury, the employer's payment is not
income to the employee." Kahn, supra note 11, at 15. This is not analogous if,
givenjoint and several liability, the employer and employee, as co-defendants,
are equally responsible for satisfying the entire judgment-debt.
46. E.g, Can. Customs & Rev. Agency, Bulletin 467R2, at¶9 (2002).
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income but be allowed to deduct them if they are included in the pay-
ee's income?
It turns out that answering this question depends in large part
on the core issue in income tax law: What should count as the measure
of taxpayer "income"? Under the popular Haig-Simons definition of tax-
payer income, no payor-payee coordination is necessary, because under
it, accessions to separate taxpayers' economic power always count as
income. Simons favored measuring individual income to ignore a tax-
payer's utility gains or losses.47 Instead he restricted the concept of indi-
vidual income to market-based gains and losses in "economic power."48
Suppose that we proceed instead under the alternative view that
any measure of personal income must, when aggregated, match the total
product from a society's capital and labor. Simons criticized this view,
including as it appeared in Lotz. 49 Warren is an exemplar of this argu-
ment in the U.S. tax literature.so This exchange approach matters if we
act as if judgment and settlement payments are bilateral exchanges
between defendant-payors and plaintiff-payees. We show here how that
view, along with some second-order design choices, might justify coor-
dinating payor-payee tax consequences of judgment and settlement
payments. In so doing, we also identify a plausible ground for taking
the general Warren-Lotz exchange view more seriously than has prior
commentary.
A. The Equal-Amounts-Realized Rule
To see how this works, let's start first with tax law's equal-amounts-
realized rule (EAR). The EAR applies when a taxpayer sells a property
47. HENRY C. SIMoNS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION
OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY (1938).
48. Id. at 221, 229.
49. Id. at 44-48, 71-74; see WALTHER LOTZ, FINANZWISSENSCHAFT
445-46 (Tiibingen 1917); see also NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX
70-72 (1955) (raising other concerns).
50. Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an
Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1085-93 (1980). For discussion, see Stanley A.
Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L. REV.
679, 690-93 (1988), and see also Joseph M. Dodge, The Story ofGlenshaw Glass:
Towards a Modern Concept of Gross Income?, in TAX STORIES 38-39 (Paul L.
Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009) (largely dismissing this argument, as applied to the
income taxation of punitive damages, as inconsistent with current U.S. tax law).
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interest to produce income, either by selling the use of property, such
as in leasing or licensing agreements, in exchange for payment (rent or
royalties), or selling interests in property of indefinite duration, includ-
ing the unqualified ownership of the property itself." In such transac-
tions, income tax law tends to treat the respective values of items of
property exchanged at arm's length as equal.5 2 This is the equal-amounts-
realized (EAR) rule. Put another way, if you and I exchange between us
one or more such items and in return get another item or several other
items, the lots exchanged are deemed to be of equal value.5 3 Suppose an
arms-length exchange in which Alice trades her stamp collection-
which cost her $2,500-for Bob's car-currently worth $10,000. Bob
had paid $12,000 for the car and had never suffered a casualty loss.
Although Alice gains $7,500 (= $10,000-$2,500) and Bob loses $2,000
(= $10,000-$12,000), for income tax purposes, Alice and Bob each real-
ize the same amount ($10,000) on the exchange.
The EAR rule, however, stands in tension with the idea that peo-
ple contract with each other only because they sincerely believe that the
transaction, once completed, will yield a net personal gain for them.
Each contracting party puts a higher value on what the other party has
promised to do as compared to what he or she has promised to do. For
example, if they agree to exchange property, then each estimates the
value of the property he or she will get to be more than the property he
or she will give up. Neither party is necessarily wrong to believe this.
After all, utility is "subjective," so the parties can differ as to the utility
of what they have promised to exchange. In our example, we infer that
Alice and Bob each enjoy a utility gain on the exchange; otherwise, she
would not trade her stamps for his car, and vice-versa.
Nevertheless, because of the EAR rule, income tax law does not
take either party's utility gain into account. This may seem surprising,
51. The U.S. tax code refers to such transactions as "dealings in
property." See, e.g., I.R.C. § 61(a)(3).
52. See, e.g., Phila. Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F.
Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
53. In the terms of U.S. tax law, the "amount realized" by one party
to an exchange is always the same as that realized by the other party (I.R.C.
§ 1001(a) [contextual definition of "amount realized"]). In contrast, a gift is not
an exchange at all. And a "bargain sale" is treated as two associated but dis-
tinct transactions, one donative and the other arm's length, and hence subject
to the assumption of equal values exchanged.
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given how income tax law elsewhere accounts for taxpayer utility.5 4 First,
taxing income-instead of wealth or consumption-can account for dif-
ferences in taxpayer's utility schedules in the pursuit of horizontal and
vertical equity. Many point to the diminishing marginal utility of income
to help them justify proportional or progressive income tax rates." Sec-
ond, the tax authorities and courts generally defer to taxpayers' subjec-
tive choices in framing their income-seeking activities by allowing
taxpayers to deduct the costs and losses of these activities as long as they
were incurred in good faith for the production of income-hence,
whether incurred for objectively good reasons or not.5 6 This seems to
occur even though, on paper, income tax laws make deductibility depend
on an objective relationship between the expenses incurred and the rea-
sonableness of any income-oriented activity the expenses are supposed
to serve.57
In any event, the EAR rule matters here, because we can treat
payments to satisfy a settlement as if they were exchanges of items of
property between plaintiff and defendant. To see why, consider the fol-
lowing illustrative examples.
Example 1: Charles sues Ace Automobile Co., alleging that
Ace sold him for $30,000 a defectively designed super-
charged diesel car. Ace and Charles settle this claim: Ace
agrees to pay Charles $35,000, and Charles agrees to return
the car to Ace. Viewed as an exchange, Charles has given up
property in which he had a basis of $30,000, and he has real-
ized $35,000, for a gain of $5,000, which should be treated as
gross income to Charles. Ace has realized an equal amount,
$35,000, under EAR. Its basis in what it gives up in the exchange
54. Commentators rarely identify this internal tension in general,
let alone as relevant to the tax treatment of defendants' litigation-related costs.
At best, a few have exemplified this tension by simultaneously criticizing and
relying upon utility-based analysis. E.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE
INCOME TAX 155-56, 166 (1986); Louis KAPLOw, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 41-43, 348-49 (2008).
55. See, e.g., BRADFORD, supra note 54, at 150-51; RICHARD A. Mus-
GRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 90-115
(1959); SVEN STEINMO, TAXATION & DEMOCRACY: SWEDISH, BRITISH AND AMERI-
CAN APPROACHES TO FINANCING THE MODERN STATE 50-52 (1993).
56. See supra note 33.
57. See supra note 27.
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is a bit mysterious but could include litigation costs Ace has not
yet deducted-the latter would not be included in the basis of
what it gave up because they were not capitalized. The rest of
what Ace realized appears to be gain and should be included
in Ace's gross income.
Example 2: Same as Example 1, except Ace settles Charles's
claim for a physical injury he suffered while driving the car.
He does not surrender the car as part of the settlement. Both
parties still each realize $35,000. Charles may be thought to
have a basis in that aspect of his well-being that was injured,
because he could have enjoyed his uninjured body without
ever having to pay tax on that enjoyment." Ace still has only a
basis in the ideal asset it exchanges that is equal to its previ-
ously capitalized litigation costs. The tax consequences for Ace
are the same as in Example 1.
Example 3: Ace Automobile Co. settles for $100,000 a claim
brought by Bash Automobile Co., alleging Ace's destruction of
Bash's goodwill by illegal competitive practices. Bash would
have $100,000 in gross income, if it has a zero basis in the
goodwill. If Ace's alleged misconduct increased the value of its
own goodwill-adding to it, so to speak-then Ace should not
be allowed to deduct the settlement amount but should instead
capitalize it to its goodwill. This amount could later reduce
Ace's gain on selling its business to another. It could also
reduce Ace's gain, or result in a deductible loss for Ace, if a
competitor settled Ace's claim for destroying Ace's goodwill.
B. The Social Product
This exchange view ofjudgments and settlements accords well with, and
may even support, the more general view that any measure of personal
income must, when aggregated, match the total product from a society's
capital and labor ("social product"). Accordingly, to elaborate the
exchange view of judgments and settlements, consider first how the
Lotz-Warren exchange view applies generally.
58. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) seems to reflect his reasoning by excluding
the amount of judgments and settlements received for personal physical injury.
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To illustrate, imagine a hypothetical society with three mem-
bers (A, B, and C). In this society, a collective cornfield is the only source
of gain, and thus, working on that cornfield is the only productive activ-
ity. If during a certain accounting period the total yield of that corn
field is, say, 1,000 ears of corn, then that society's social product for that
period is 1,000 ears of corn (S= 1,000). If we tax the cornfield's total yield
at, say, a 5% tax rate (t= 0.05), then the total tax on the social product
is 50 ears of corn (t(S) = 0.05 x 1,000 = 50). To make this calculation,
we do not need the Haig-Simons definition of personal income for each
member of the society (IA' B' IC), if we can tax the social product at its
source (at the corn field, before the corn is distributed to A, B, and C)
and if we do not care how much of it each person in the society receives.
If, however, one wants tax burdens to vary by person (say, to
achieve a desired redistribution of the social product), or if it is too hard
to collect the tax at the source, the Haig-Simons definition matters. That
definition starts with the person or other taxable unit of analysis and, in
effect, identifies how much of the social product "has ended up in each
taxable unit."5 9 Thus, in our hypothetical three-member society, each
person's personal income tax rate (tA, tB, tc) can vary by how many ears
of corn each person receives during the accounting period. However, the
sum of the tax imposed on each person's Haig-Simons income should
ideally still equal the revenue of an income tax on the entire social prod-
uct (t (S) = tA(IA ) + tB(IB) + tC(Ic ) = 50).60 In the simplest case, if everyone
(A, B, and C) has their Haig-Simons income subject to the same tax rate,
then the sum of Haig-Simons income of each taxable unit in the society
should match that society's social product, because the requirement
t(S) = t(IA ) + t(IB C+ t(I) reduces to the requirement S=IA 'B IC
If so, the ideal income tax must treat the non-productive trans-
fers of items of value by offsetting any recognized gain to the transferee
with a reduction in the income of the transferor for the accounting period.
Otherwise, the sum of personal income would inaccurately estimate the
social product.
To see why, suppose again aggregate yield in the t ree-member
hypothetical society's collective corn field is 1,000 ears of corn. This
corn is distributed among A, B, and C. Thereafter, person A misplaces
59. Warren, supra note 50, at 1086.
60. More generally, for every taxable person p in the society
with n members, the ideal personal income tax t satisfies the condition that
t, (S) = t (I)
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100 ears and person B finds those 100 ears. As a result, B's Haig-Simons
income increases by 100 ears. If we did not reduce A's Haig-Simons
income by 100 ears, then even in the simplest case (where tax rates do
not vary by personal income), the sum of personal income would over-
estimate the social product (S<IA 'B IC) by 100 ears (at 1,100 ears).6 1
To be sure, under this approach, we can debate whether a trans-
fer is productive, i.e., whether the transfer produced a return (from cap-
ital, labor, or whatever source) and thereby increased the social product.62
This ambiguity-about when a transfer affects the social product-
matters for the tax treatment of damage payments. On the one hand,
damage payments can be deemed non-productive transfers from losing
(or settling) defendants to winning (or settling) plaintiffs. After all,
defendants do not undertake such transfers themselves to produce per-
sonal gain. If defendants could avoid damages payments altogether, they
would.
On the other hand, damages payments, in the aggregate, may
cause the social product to be larger than it otherwise would have been.
For example, some argue that negligence law is (or is best justified as)
a way to reduce the society's overall accident costs-the sum of what
accident victims suffer and what people pay to avoid accidents: By
encouraging private actors to take only cost-justified accident precau-
tions, negligence law demands transfers from tortfeasors to tort victims
61. Warren, supra note 50, at 1087-88. For Koppelman (supra note
50, at 691-92), this approach implies that payors in productive transfers must
be denied a deduction.
62. Koppelman (supra note 50, at 693) concluded that Warren
"appears arbitrary" in how he treats personal expenditures, absent "some reason
for distinguishing among various personal uses [of resources] in this man-
ner." Similarly, Simons (supra note 47, at 46) complained of similar anteced-
ent ideas that although "it is impossible to distinguish sharply between uses of
resources which involve production, predation, and mere waste," the idea of a
"social income" requires "[s]uch distinctions." Simons went further: The idea
of social income necessarily collapses into a "welfare conception," because
finding an increase in it amounts to an "ethical or aesthetic judgment" that there
was more of, or more efficient use of, "things which must be economized." Id.
On the other hand, while it will be unclear in some cases whether a particular
transfer increased the social product, the number of such ambiguous cases
could be tolerable as close to or less than the number of ambiguous cases aris-
ing from other tax-law concepts (e.g., "realized" gain vs. other appreciation).
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only under circumstances that, in the aggregate, reduce both accidents
and accident-precaution costs.
If current negligence law does this, then absent damage pay-
ments to resolve negligence lawsuits, the members of the society would
have had fewer resources to devote to corn-growing and other activities
whose aggregate yield comprises the social product. However, such an
effect on the social product might be an emergent property of the legal
processing of accident claims as a whole. On this view, damage pay-
ments might increase the social product-by causing the collective corn-
field yield to be bigger than it otherwise would be-but, for any particular
damage payment, the individual payor reaps no net gain that can be
traced back to that payment. If damage payments are deemed "produc-
tive" transfers on this ground, the social product can be more than the
sum of individual income (S A IB + C), thus departing from a neces-
sary condition of the social-product approach.
To avoid this result, we could treat damage payments as non-
productive transfers and attribute the aggregate effect of such pay-
ments to durable features of the social institutions that process legal
claims. Thus, the legal system, like roads and bridges, is an item of
infrastructure-a societal investment to facilitate increases in social
product. After all, even in an accounting period where no damage pay-
ments in fact occur, the prospect of such payments may still push people
to adjust how carefully or how often they act, thus reducing overall acci-
dents costs and, as a result, causing the social product to be larger than it
otherwise would.
C. Coordination
To simplify, let us assume that damages payments do not generally
increase the social product. Then, accurately matching the sum of
Haig-Simons personal income with the social product requires (1)
offsetting gains to plaintiffs' Haig-Simons income from damage
payments by reducing defendants' Haig-Simons income, or (2)
offsetting exclusions of such transfers from plaintiff's income by
refusing to reduce the defendant's Haig-Simons income by that trans-
fer amount. Both plaintiff and defendant can deduct losses, if any
are incurred before or as a result of claim settlement or judgment.
Nothing in this approach precludes, however, assigning the offset to a
random taxpayer in the society, though second-order considerations
may motivate coordinating the offset as between plaintiff-payees
and defendant-payors.
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To see why, consider again the simplest case of our three-member
hypothetical society in which tax rates do not vary by person and aggre-
gate yield in the collective cornfield (the only social product) is 1,000
ears of corn. After the pre-tax distribution of those ears of corn, person
A loses 100 ears of corn in an unexpected fire. B is found to have set the
fire and is liable to A for damages caused by the fire. Therefore B pays
100 ears to A. If the tax law recognized A's personal income as increas-
ing by 100 ears but did not treat B's income as reduced by 100 ears, then
the sum of Haig-Simons personal income would overestimate total yield
(S<IA B Ic) by 100 ears (at 1,100 ears). If, however, the tax law did
not recognize A's Haig-Simons income as increasing by 100 ears, then
all else equal, letting B deduct 100 ears from its Haig-Simons income
would cause the sum of Haig-Simons personal income to underestimate
the social product (S>IA B +C) by 100 ears (at 900 ears). This reason-
ing, however, does not apply to fines or similar payments made to the
government. If B only paid 100 ears of corn to the government as a civil
penalty for setting the fire, then A has no gain from B to offset.
Thus far, however, the argument is indifferent as to who bears
the burden or benefit from the offset, so long as some other person or
taxable unit in the society does. For example, if B pays A 100 ears of corn
in damages; the tax law recognizes A's personal income as increasing
by 100 ears; but if that tax law only lets C, not B, deduct 100 ears from C's
income, then, all else equal, we still satisfy the condition that S = I +B C+ I
To be sure, B might complain that it, not C, should be allowed to take
the deduction, but that complaint turns on how much that result deviates
from the desired (and separately justified) redistribution of the social
product among A, B, and C that the income tax aims to accomplish.6 3
63. More generally, for any taxable person p in the society (with n
members) that receives a damages payment that is treated as included in its
income, we could offset the gain to that person by randomly awarding a deduc-
tion in the same amount to any other taxable person in the society, so long as
the fact or prospect of such random assignment does not itself cause a depar-
ture from the condition that t (S) = " t (I). Absent any such coordinated
offset for someone, it is, all else equal, more likely that the sum of Haig-Simons
personal income will inaccurately measure the social product during the
accounting period. If there is, as a result, a difference with the aggregated
revenue of an ideal personal income tax (|t (S)= E1 t ()| 0), that differ-
ence amounts to over-taxation or under-taxation of the social product that
must be independently justified.
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Nonetheless, here are two second-order reasons for assigning
the offset to the payor. First, compared to randomly awarding it, we may
need to award the offset (the deduction) to the defendant-payor to achieve
the desired after-tax distribution of the social product. Second, it may
today be cheaper for tax administration (particularly where tax rates
vary by person), because the defendant-payor is the best situated to know
how much it paid and thus how large of an offset (deduction) to seek.
Here is a reason for not coordinating the tax treatment of dam-
age payments and receipts: Doing so may produce legal uncertainty for
whoever is assigned the offset, as well as for the tax authorities who must
settle their tax liability. For example, suppose the tax law assigns the
offset to the payor. If A paid damages to B, A's deduction for that dam-
age payment turns on whether the tax authorities do in fact treat B's
receipt as included or excluded from B's income. But if the tax treat-
ment of B's receipt is uncertain, A cannot confidently estimate its after-
tax cost of the productive activity that gave rise to the damages payment.
This causes greater uncertainty for A and for any court that has to decide
whether A's deduction is allowable. Conversely, suppose that including
a damage-payment receipt as part of B's gross income turns on whether
A's deduction for that payment is allowable. If the tax treatment of A's
deduction is uncertain, then B suffers greater uncertainty as to its gross
income, as does any court called on to measure B's gross income.
To avoid this result, we could design the tax law to allow
defendant-payors (or someone else) to deduct their damage payments
without regard to whether the payee could or did exclude such receipts
from gross income. If so, then all else equal, the sum of Haig-Simons
personal income would underestimate the social product, resulting in a
certain amount of foregone tax revenue.6 4 Such forgone revenue may be
best understood as a social expenditure (a tax expenditure) to reduce
the costs borne by taxpayers of inaccurately estimating the after-tax cost
of their income-producing activities.
Finally, if we do decide to coordinate the tax treatment of dam-
age payments and receipts, we must disallow a deduction for the payor
(or a randomly selected third party) if there are independent reasons for
letting the payee exclude its receipt of that payment from its income.
Consider, for example, damage payments that are tied to payee losses
in the sense that the payee, once paid, is deemed thereby to have gotten
64. That is, foregone revenue in an amount that equals t (S) -
t (I).
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back the item lost. Suppose someone illegally took away your widget,
today worth $100. In a competitive market for widgets with zero prod-
uct differentiation, you may be indifferent between getting a new (iden-
tical) widget (worth $100) or getting back the old widget (or its cash
value, $100). For tax design, however, getting back the item of value
(here, the widget or its cash equivalent) increases your wealth if you
already took a deduction for that loss.
To illustrate, imagine that personal wealth for an individual A
is his or her current stock of widgets. (Wealth is a fixed quantity of pur-
chasing power of which income is any positive change.) If A suffers a
"loss" when B steals one of A's widgets, A suffers a decrease in wealth-
one less widget in A's stock. If A gets its widget back (or its equivalent
in damages, $100), A's wealth increases, but that increase is calibrated
to offset the loss, so there is no net personal gain for A. This implies that
damage payments calibrated to cover such losses-sometimes called
"compensatory damages"-should be excluded from the payee's income.
Suppose, however, A had already taken a deduction for that loss.
(Doing so may be necessary to accurately measure A's net income in
cases where B steals A's widget in an accounting period before A gets
the widget back.) If so, then A's wealth increases as result. That increase,
however, would not offset the loss-the deduction already was supposed
to have accounted for that. Thus, what A received, though nominally just
to "compensate" for A's loss, should be included in A's income.
Meanwhile, should B be allowed to deduct the compensatory
payment to A? Under the Haig-Simons definition of income, the answer
must be yes. Upon paying A, B's economic power goes down and that
reduction should be reflected in B's income for the period. After all, the
broader purpose of B's activity-stealing the widget from A-was to
produce income (albeit by illegal means). In contrast, under the exchange
approach, since restitution is a non-productive transfer, the transferor
(B, in our illustration) should not be permitted to deduct a restitutive
payment. Otherwise, the income tax system will systematically mismea-
sure the social product.6 5
In turn, under either approach, some losses are or should argu-
ably be deductible by the payee-and thus "compensatory" payments
65. The German income tax expressly disallows the deduction
of damages payments that are not restitutive but allows those that are.
Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [Income Tax Act], Oct. 8, 2009, BGBL I at
3384-85, § 4 (Ger.).
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received for them should be excluded from payee income-because such
deductions are necessary to accurately measure payee net income. For
example, an income tax system should exclude from a payee's income
those damage payments that are supposed to replace payee items that
were already taxed as income-for example, wages that, but for the
defendant-payor's conduct, would have been taxed at the source before
disbursed to the payee. Otherwise, the payee would be taxed twice on
the same receipt.
Another example: If damage payments are supposed to cover
losses to endowments that payees are taken to have had since birth
(e.g., health or human dignity), then we should exclude those payments
from payee income. The reason: Those endowments cannot reasonably
be taxed at all, which is the same as acting as if they had already been
taxed. Otherwise, the taxpayer who receives a damages payment to
cover the loss of an eye or limb will, all else equal, face a greater tax
burden than she would in a world in which she had never lost that eye
or limb. The reason: In that counterfactual world, she never would
have faced an income tax bill on those items.
VI. LITIGATION-RELATED COSTS AS CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
This section identifies the implications of treating litigation-related costs
as capital expenditures tied to a right to receipts pursuant to a court judg-
ment or settlement agreement, or a legal claim, that is, a conditional
right to such receipts. In general, income tax law treats litigation-related
costs as general outlays associated with whatever activity gives rise to
the litigation, not costs incurred to buy a specific economic benefit that
can only be obtained by litigation.66 However, Dodge, following Daven-
port, has argued that, under U.S. tax law, a plaintiff's litigation costs
should be treated as capital expenditures attributed to the legal rights
that the plaintiff's litigation may establish, such as the plaintiff's right
to recover damages that is established when a court enters a judgment
for damages in the plaintiff's favor.67 Once established, this right is itself
an asset, i.e., a right to future receipts (or, in the case of a settlement
agreement for periodic payments, a stream of receipts). Accordingly,
66. E.g., Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) § 8(b) (Can.).
67. Dodge, supra note 40; Brief for Amicus Curiae Professor Charles
Davenport in Support of Respondents, Comm'r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005)
(Nos. 03-892, 03-907), 2004 WL 1860016, at *12.
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Dodge argues, U.S. tax law should permit the plaintiff to offset capital-
ized litigation-related costs against those future receipts, including the
costs incurred to create the right (litigation-related costs to secure
the judgment) and to secure the asset after its creation (e.g., the cost of
securing a judgment lien in case the defendant refuses to satisfy the
judgment).68
Dodge's argument presupposes that plaintiffs' litigation-related
costs should be deductible at all if paid as the costs of income-producing
activity (here, for example, attorney fees to secure the right to damages
receipts). Dodge, however, does not adequately explain why this should
be so. It is not enough to answer that the right to a judgment is just as
much an "asset" or "property" as land or a patent, because "asset" and
"property" are not self-defining except in aid to why the costs to acquire
such an "asset" or "property" should be deductible at all.
In general, treating certain costs of income-producing activity
as capital expenditures is a way to match those costs with the receipts
of the accounting period to which they are properly attributable, thereby
resulting in a more accurate calculation of net income. In this respect,
treating costs as capital expenditures matters for when and how a deduc-
tion for such costs may be taken (i.e., at the time of asset disposition and
as an offset to any resulting gain from disposition), not whether they
should be deductible at all. Thus, if litigation-related costs are not prop-
erly attributable to income-producing activity, then those costs should
not affect the calculation of net personal income, and that should hold
regardless of whether the tax law treats those costs as deductible expenses
or capital expenditures. We need to figure out why we ought to attribute
those costs to an income-producing activity before we choose whether
to treat those costs as capital expenditures.
Yet, let us assume arguendo that we do choose to treat a plain-
tiff's right to receipts from a judgment or settlement as a capital asset,
and by extension a legal claim as a conditional right to such receipts.
That choice also implies treating as capital expenditures a defendant's
litigation-related costs to pursue a legal defense to the plaintiff's claim
in the plaintiff's lawsuit. The parties to a lawsuit pursue claims and
defenses with an eye toward gain. For a legal defense, that gain comes in
the form of a total or partial offset against the debt that, but for the suc-
cessfully established efense, a defendant would otherwise owe the plain-
tiff. A defense to liability, if successful, reduces what the defendant
68. Dodge, supra note 40, at 298-304.
2018] 563
would otherwise owe the plaintiff to zero. A defense to remedy, if suc-
cessful, reduces but does not eliminate the defendant's judgment-debt
that it would otherwise owe.
In this respect, capitalizing the costs of a legal defense is like
capitalizing the cost of buying coupons that will reduce the cost of other
items. To some extent, both coupons and legal defenses represent options
to reduce the price of an item or activity. The cost of coupons is not
deductible when incurred but when later events occur, because the cap-
italization of the cost of a coupon under the U.S. income tax generally
follows the treatment of employee stock options and other forfeitable
property interests acquired in connection with the performance of
services.69
Just as coupons lower the price of a potential future purchase,
legal defenses reduce or eliminate a potential judgment-debt. To be sure,
unlike the benefit of buying coupons, the size of any offset due to a legal
defense must be discounted by its probability of success on that defense
in the lawsuit. This is sometimes hard to estimate and may only be par-
tially affected by the defendant's efforts in pursuing that defense.
69. The value of "property" transferred to a taxpayer in connection
with the performance of services (less what the taxpayer paid to acquire it) is
included in her gross income, albeit only when any condition of forfeiture
related to those services lapses. I.R.C. § 83(a). Section 83's term "property"
includes "real and personal property other than either money or an unfunded
and unsecured promise to pay money or property in the future." Reg. § 1.83-3(e);
see Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Taxing the Promise to Pay, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 1092, 1125-39 (2005) (arguing that exclusion in Reg. § 1.83-3(e) for
"unfunded and unsecured promise to pay" only covers promise to pay by ser-
vice recipient, not by a third party, including stock options (see Reg. § 1.83-7)).
Before section 83 was adopted, the Supreme Court had already held that the
value of a stock option may not be included in an employee's gross income
until the option was exercised, and then only to the extent of the difference
between the market value and the option exercise price. Comm'r v. LoBue, 351
U.S. 243, 247-49 (1956). The exclusion of any amount a taxpayer has paid for
an option makes explicit that the holding in LoBue would exclude pre-payment
by the taxpayer of part of the stock price. "If section 83(a) does not apply to the
grant of such an option because the option does not have a readily ascertainable
fair market value at the time of grant," Reg. § 1.83-7(a) provides, "sections 83(a)
and 83(b) shall apply at the time the option is exercised or otherwise disposed
of, even though the fair market value of such option may have become readily
ascertainable before such time."
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Nonetheless, any such contingency with legal defenses also holds for
legal claims. After all, a legal claim is a right to receipts from the defen-
dant that is conditional on both whether the plaintiff wins the lawsuit
and how much the judge or jury awards the plaintiff.
VII. DEFAULT RULE: SETTLING DEFENDANT PROMISES NOT TO
SEEK DEDUCTION
This section proposes a novel default rule for settlement agreements:
Unless a settlement agreement expressly indicates otherwise, a settling
defendant promises not to seek an otherwise allowable tax deduction for
litigation-related costs. This section shows why such a settlement term
is enforceable under current U.S. law, and why a default rule to this effect
would encourage more discussion of the tax-design choices that this
Article identifies.
For such a settlement erm to be enforceable, two conditions must
hold: (1) the jurisdiction's income tax law allows deductions for the
taxpayer's litigation-related costs, but does not require that taxpayer to
take those deductions; and (2) where the defendant breaks a promise in
a settlement agreement or consent decree not to seek that deduction, the
plaintiff-counterparty is entitled to monetary recovery based on defen-
dant's net gain as a result of conscious breach of that promise, i.e., the
value of the deduction's tax benefit to the defendant.
First, in general, the tax law itself does not necessarily prohibit
promises not to seek available deductions, because such law does or
should treat deductions as optional, not mandatory, for the taxpayer.
Maule argues that, in general, most U.S. tax deductions and credits are
optional, not mandatory, for the taxpayer.7 0 He points to the phrase "shall
be allowed" in various Code provisions authorizing a deduction, and
argues that this phrase can and should be read to make deductions and
credits optional (i.e., must be allowed only if claimed on the tax return),
unless the Code expressly indicates otherwise.7 1 Such a reading permits
a taxpayer to elect to forsake a more accurate measure of its net income
in favor of some other tax advantage or non-tax advantage, such as favor-
able publicity or reduced probability of a tax audit. More importantly,
we can think of no general tax-design reason to force a taxpayer to take
70. James Edward Maule, No Thanks, Uncle Sam, You Can Keep
Your Tax Break, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 81 (2006).
71. Id. at 95-96.
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a deduction, given taxpayer knowledge of and consent to the implica-
tions of forsaking that deduction.
Second, if a defendant breaches a promise not to seek a tax
deduction for its litigation-related costs, the plaintiff may still be enti-
tled to restitution damages equal to the value of the defendant's reduced
tax liability because of the deduction. By seeking that deduction, that
defendant has committed an opportunistic breach of contract, for which
disgorgement of the defendant's net profits as a result is recognized, for
example, in the United States as an appropriate remedy in the common
law of many States.7 2
Such a disgorgement remedy is even more likely where the settle-
ment terms become the terms of a court approved consent decree that,
as a result, may be enforced by contempt sanctions. For example, in the
United States, federal courts have recognized disgorgement of profits
as a remedy for compensatory civil contempt.7 3 The States, however,
vary. Many States do not recognize any damages remedy in a civil
contempt proceeding under either the relevant statutory authority for con-
tempt or under State common law.74 Some States do, either on motion
for contempt, a separate motion for damages in the same proceeding, or
in a separate damages action,7 5 but only sometimes is it clear that such
damages include disgorgement.7 6 Moreover, unlike in a contract action,
in most U.S. jurisdictions, the trial judge in a civil contempt proceeding
may award attorney fees to the prevailing party.7 7
72 For discussion, see the commentary to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
73. Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 457
(1932); Marshakv. Treadwell, 595 F.3d 478, 495 (3d Cir. 2009); Jerry's Famous
Deli, Inc. v. Papanicolaou, 383 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004); Howard Johnson
Co. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1521 (11th Cir. 1990); Manhattan Indus. v.
Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 885 F.2d 1, 5-7 (2d Cir. 1989); Connolly v. J.T.
Ventures, 851 F.2d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1988).
74. Annotation, Right ofInjured Party to Award of Compensatory
Damages or Fine in Contempt Proceedings, 85 A.L.R.3d 895, § 5 (2018).
75. Lightsey v. Kensington Mortg. & Fin. Corp., 315 So.2d 431, 437
(Ala. 1975).
76. E.g., Mitchells Salon & Day Spa, Inc. v. Bustle, 931 N.E.2d 1172
(Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (disgorgement of profits as contempt remedy for non-
compete provision in consent judgment).
77. A.S. Klein, Annotation, Allowance ofAttorneys' Fees in Civil
Contempt Proceedings, 43 A.L.R.3d 793, § 3(a) (2018).
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Even if enforceable, settling parties are still unlikely to adopt
such a settlement erm on their own. The gap between nominal and after-
tax settlement price is usually invisible to the public, and perhaps even
to some judges who must decide whether to approve a settlement. The
settling plaintiff (the settlement payment recipient) has little reason to
press the issue, since a likely result is that the settling defendant lowers
its nominal settlement price accordingly. To be sure, in recent years, U.S.
securities regulators have included in some settlement agreements or
consent orders a provision in which the defendant promises not o seek
a tax deduction or credit under any tax law for any payment amount that
the agreement designates as a penalty.7 8
Here, we care about settlement agreements in which the defen-
dant agrees not to seek deductions for litigation-related payments not
designated as penalties. Some plaintiffs, such as litigation advocacy
groups, may want defendants to pay any negotiated pre-tax settlement
price-to accomplish the deterrence effect of compensatory settlement
payments, for example-but lack a government's power to impose (non-
deductible) penalties. Sometimes plaintiffs have enough leverage to force
defendants to agree to such terms. For example, in its 2014 plea agree-
ment with Credit Suisse on criminal charges of tax fraud, federal pros-
ecutors included a term that no part of "the fine or other payment[]"
required by the plea agreement-including a $666.5 million restitution
payment to the IRS-"will serve as a basis for Credit Suisse AG to claim,
78. E.g., Consent of Defendant Bear, Stearns & Co. at ¶ 6, SEC v.
Bear, Stearns & Co., 03 Civ. 2937 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), https://www.sec.gov/liti
gation/litreleases/consentbear.pdf; Settlement Agreement at 4, People v. UBS
Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 06/405236 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 16, 2007); Consent Order
Between Mass. Sec. Div. and Deutsche Bank Securities at § IX(F), In re Deut-
sche Bank Securities, Inc., No. 2012-0020 (Mar. 13, 2013). Other settlements
limit a defendant's designation of settlement payments as penalties. E.g., Con-
sent Judgment at Ex. B: Distribution of Funds ¶ 1(b)(ii)), United States v. Bank
of Am. Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00361-RMC (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012). These provisions
matter, because under U.S. tax law, how the parties characterize the nature of
the payments (e.g., fine or compensation) in the settlement agreement can affect
how the tax authority treats such payments, or at least expects them to be
reported, under I.R.C. § 162(f), which disallows fines and similar penalties paid
to government for a violation of law. See WOOD, supra note 10, at ch. 5. But cf
Fresenius Med. Care Holdings v. United States, 763 F.3d 64, 70-71 (1st Cir.
2014) (focusing on "economic reality" of the settlement, where parties do not
agree on how settlement should be treated for tax purposes).
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assert, or apply for, either directly or indirectly, any tax deduction, any
tax credit, or any other offset against any U.S. federal, state, or local tax
or taxable income."7 9 The problem: Many plaintiffs either cannot or do
not care to demand such a settlement term.
One solution is for a court or legislature to adopt this default
rule for interpreting settlement agreements: Unless a settlement agree-
ment expressly indicates otherwise, courts must take as an implicit set-
tlement term that the settling defendant promises not to seek an otherwise
allowable tax deduction for litigation-related costs. This default rule has
one key advantage: The gap between nominal and after-tax settlement
price-though it may remain as before-becomes substantially more
visible. To escape the default rule, settling parties would have to include
in settlement agreements an express term allowing a party to seek a tax
deduction for litigation-related costs. In turn, when they find an express
term in a settlement, judges and other could credibly infer that the set-
tling parties were aware of the gap between the nominal and the after-
tax settlement price, and settled anyway.
Thus, in deciding whether to approve a settlement, the presence
of the express term would nudge judges to expressly inquire into what
the after-tax settlement price would be. The same would hold for policy-
makers and the public who are concerned about the nominal settlement
price announced by government regulators and settling defendants. If
the concern becomes particularly acute for some subset of cases, poli-
cymakers would then be forced to grapple with whether and how to
abrogate that default rule when they enact or amend causes of action.
The desired result: more extensive dialogue about the kind of tax-design
choices this Article identifies.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article extends the prior literature on the deductibility of litiga-
tion costs by showing that deductibility of these costs may affect fun-
damental income tax design. In particular, this Article identified a series
of design choices that are analytically distinct from particular redistribu-
tive goals of the tax system or from any corrective justice or social wel-
fare maximization goals behind imposing monetary sanctions for illegal
conduct: (1) how to attribute litigation-related costs to any particular
79. Plea Agreement at ¶ 7(B)(6), United States v. Credit Suisse AG,
No. 1:14-cr-188-RBS (E.D. Va. May 19, 2014).
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income-producing activity; (2) how to treat liability insurer payments
made on a defendant's behalf as income to that defendant; (3) grounds for
coordinating the tax treatment of a payor's damages payments with the
tax treatment of those receipts to the payee; and (4) whether litigation-
related costs should be treated as capital expenditures related to the
right to receipts established or sought to be established by the litigation
itself. Finally, we showed how, under current law, parties may enforce
settlement agreements under which a settling defendant promises not
to seek a tax deduction for litigation-related costs. We proposed adopt-
ing such a settlement term as a default rule for settlement agreements.
Such default rule would make more visible the gap between nominal
and after-tax settlement price and would, as a result, motivate policy-
makers and commentators to grapple more fully with the tax-design
choices associated with litigation-related costs, including the issues we
identify here.
